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Many questions in animal intelligence and cognition research are challenging. One
challenge is to identify mechanisms underlying reasoning in experiments. Here, we
provide a way to design such tests in non-human animals. We know from research in
skill acquisition in humans that reasoning and thinking can take time because some
problems are processed in multiple steps before a solution is reached (e.g., during
mental arithmetics). If animals are able to learn through similar processes their decision
making can be time consuming, and most importantly improve if more time to process
information is allowed. We tested if performance of two Sumatran orangutans (Pongo
abelii) increased in a two-choice experiment when they were allowed extra time before
making their decisions, compared to when they were forced to decide immediately. We
found that the performance of the orangutans did not depend on the time they were
allowed to process the information before making their decisions. This methodology
provides a potential avenue for empirical tests of mechanisms underlying reasoning in
non-human animals.
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INTRODUCTION
A fundamental question in animal intelligence and cognition research is if, or to what extent,
non-human animals have capacities for causal reasoning during learning and decision making
(defined in, e.g., Emery and Clayton, 2004, see also Reznikova, 2010). It has been suggested, for
example, that birds and apes can reason when learning physical and social tasks (e.g., Hill et al.,
2011; Jelbert et al., 2015; Smirnova et al., 2015, but see Ghirlanda and Lind, 2017). However,
there is no consensus regarding the extent of non-human animal reasoning capacities and many
debates stem from disputes regarding methodological issues, for example with respect to insight
learning (see discussion between, e.g., Bird and Emery, 2009 and Lind et al., 2009), cognitive maps
(Tolman and Honzik, 1930; Anthony, 1959; Ciancia, 1991), and social learning (see e.g., Heyes,
2012 commenting on Horner et al., 2011).
That it is difficult to identify reasoning in non-human animals is well known (e.g., Anthony,
1959; Penn and Povinelli, 2007; Lind et al., 2009; Reznikova, 2010) and researchers have called
for novel methodologies to improve identification of mental capacities (e.g., Povinelli and Vonk,
2003; Heyes, 2012). One problem has been to devise methods that can operationalize ideas about
how animals perform mental operations, that is capturing what is meant by causal reasoning
(Emery and Clayton, 2004), reasoning about mental states of others (Povinelli and Vonk, 2003),
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or if animals solve problems through insight (Bird and Emery,
2009; but see Lind et al., 2009). With inspiration from computer
programming and human thinking, we here describe a way to
identify reasoning capacities by examining if the time allowed
to attend to a problem increases the likelihood of successfully
solving that problem, and we provide data from an experiment
with Sumatran orangutans (Pongo abelii). In addition, our test
can control for operant conditioning, by some considered a
prerequisite for testing cognition beyond associative learning
(e.g., Pearce, 2008; Lind et al., 2009; Heyes, 2012; Neves Filho
et al., 2015).
We find no reasons within learning theory (see e.g., Rescorla
and Wagner, 1972; Pearce and Bouton, 2001) that decision
making based on associative learning should improve if more
time is allowed before a choice is made. And, we see important
similarities between standard associative learning and what in
computer programming is called early binding (Enquist et al.,
2016). In early binding solutions to previously experienced
problems are stored in a table. Accordingly, an animal that
encounters a situation only has access to already established
behaviors that, so to speak, can be picked from a table of
suitable responses. In late binding, however, a decision-making
mechanism is free to use detailed information in different ways.
An animal capable of late binding can recall previous experiences,
filter out useful ones, and reorganize information to figure out the
solution to the problem at hand. Importantly, no ready-made,
previously established, solutions must be stored and used. The
way behaviors are described as flexible, insightful and caused
by reasoning fit well within the concept of late binding (e.g.,
Tomasello and Call, 1997; Emery and Clayton, 2004; Tecwyn
et al., 2012; Jelbert et al., 2014; Smirnova et al., 2015).
There is a large body of literature concerned with the
relationship between behavior and time. Studies have measured,
for instance, how long time it took a macaque to respond to
visual discriminations of different difficulties (Sayers et al., 2015),
that response time can vary with changing conditions in visual
discrimination task (Beran et al., 2004) and whether time to
make decisions regarding visual stimuli and video clips of hand
movements correlated with a measurement of confidence in the
decision (Patel et al., 2012). In our study, we did not measure
response time but instead set time under experimental control by
using two fixed durations so that decisions made by orangutans
were forced to either occur immediately or after a set time delay.
Human reasoning, when comparable to late binding in
computer programming, can take a long time. Let us illustrate.
In humans, when calculating 3∗3 you are likely to give the correct
answer instantaneously, it is something you just know as a result
of extensive previous learning. However, if you are asked to
calculate something less familiar, such as 13∗17, it might take a
longer time because you have to perform an actual arithmetic
operation. Now information must be reorganized in several steps
to produce the correct answer (see e.g., Anderson, 1982; VanLehn,
1996). Problems can even take hours or days to solve. In dual
process theory researchers often call this an explicit process (e.g.,
Sun, 2001), and Kahneman (2011) made this concept famous as
slow thinking, characterized by slow and attention demanding
mental processing. That higher performance is achieved in
decision experiments when more time is allowed has been shown
in children. Small children could only perform as well as older
children if they were allowed 15 s extra time to think about the
problem at hand (Pezdek and Miceli, 1982). The task was based
on verbal and visual stimuli, presented in sequences, and subjects
were required to distinguish between semantically relevant and
irrelevant items. Other experiments have shown that human
mental operations can take time. Here, humans and pigeons were
exposed to a set of mental rotation tests and only humans needed
more time to correctly match test stimuli to sample stimuli
(Hollard and Delius, 1982). Nevertheless, it should be noted that
additional time can only be beneficial if the problem to be solved
is within the capacitiy of the test subject.
If more time for decision making improves problem solving,
the process can depend on some kind of reasoning ability that
includes reorganization of information. This means that an
animal with a capacity for late binding should, if allowed enough
time to process the information, solve problems with higher
precision than animals without such a capacity. We tested this
hypothesis with two Sumatran orangutans who were subjected
to a set of two-choice problems in two treatments; they either
had to make their choice immediately upon presentation, or they
were given time before making their choice, thus allowing time
for potential reorganization of information.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Ethics Statement
The study was approved by the Uppsala regional ethics
committee (No. C169/10), and Lund University Primate Research
Station at Furuvik Zoo is an approved cognitive research
facility (No. 31-2599/09). Experiments were performed in a
compartment that is part of the everyday facilities. Only one
animal at a time was allowed in the experimental compartment
to make sure that all tests were novel at the time of testing for
both animals. If an orangutan did not want to proceed with
an experiment it was always allowed to leave the experimental
compartment. However, this did not happen. All applicable
international, national, and institutional guidelines for the care
and use of animals were followed. All procedures performed here
were in accordance with the ethical standards of the institution
and practice at which the studies were conducted.
Procedure
Both orangutans were experienced test subjects, the female
Igelchen born in 1985, and the male Naong born in 1990 (e.g.,
Osvath and Osvath, 2008; Osvath and Persson, 2013). They were
capable of manually indicating objects in choice situations. They
were also capable of all actions needed in the experiment, such
as raking, pulling strings, drinking from flasks using straws, and
pour objects (such as peanuts) from containers.
We used a two-choice method and presented, out of reach, two
similar objects on a tray 30 cm apart. Only one of the two objects
was functional and could result in a reward (a peanut or fruit
drink). The other object was non-functional in a visually overt
way, such as a broken string, a non-functional slack rake, a tube
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with walls that prevented peanuts from falling out, or a straw that
did not allow the orangutan to drink the fluid (Figure 1). A trial
started by the removal of an opaque cardboard screen behind
which stimuli had been hidden. When subjects indicated their
choice the non-chosen object was immediately taken away, and
the tray was pushed toward the orangutan so it could reach the
indicated object and use it to get the reward. Reaching the reward
was only possible if a functional tool was chosen. In the tube task
(all tasks are presented below), however, the orangutans were not
allowed to manipulate any objects. Instead, when the non-chosen
object was taken away, the experimenter turned the chosen tube
around so that the reward could fall down on the tray, if the
functional tube was chosen. Alternatively, if the non-functional
tube was chosen the food reward remained trapped in the tube
(Figure 1).
We tested four versions of four different tasks (see below).
Thus each subject was tested on 16 problems. Each problem was
tested within one session with six repetitions (inter-trial intervals
at approximately 60 s). Both orangutans were thus exposed to 16
different problems, with 6 trials for each problem. The setup was
pseudo-randomized so that the attainable rewards were balanced
across left and right sides. Both orangutans did the four tasks in
the following order: rope, rake, tube, flask.
To test for time-dependent decision making we introduced a
time delay in half of all trials. These trials were identical apart
from that now the orangutans had the opportunity to observe
the two objects for 45 s before making their choices. Due to
expected loss of attention, longer time delays were not used.
Because novelty, that is initial performance, is important, each
problem was balanced across the two subjects with respect to time
delay. When only testing two individuals, we were only able to
perform within subject statistical tests. An individual always had
the same delay treatment for all six trials within a session. That
is, if Igelchen had time-delay on a specific problem, say problem
one of the rope task, then Naong did not have the time-delay
on that same problem, and vice versa. Because we only tested
FIGURE 1 | Illustration of experimental tasks. In task 1 only one of the ropes could result in a peanut being pulled in. Where ropes were crossed we used both
differently colored ropes (light and dark) and ropes of the same color. In task 2, only one of two rakes was functional. The zig-zag forms represent thin and slack
ropes which could not be used to push the rakes forward. Therefore, the rakes were too short for a peanut to be raked in. In task 3 the orangutans were not allowed
to manipulate any object but instead choose the tube where a peanut could fall out without being blocked by a styrofoam wall (solid black). In task 4 the orangutans
were allowed to choose between transparent flasks where one flask in each session had a straw in a functional position, whereas the other four were too short, not
in contact with the fluid, was blocked to prevent flow of fluid, and outside the flask, respectively. Note that due to unclear results from the preference test in task 4 we
did not use data from this task in our analysis.
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two individuals, we could only perform statistical tests within
individuals.
It was critical to know that the orangutans had the potential
to solve all problems and that they always preferred the rewards
over the objects themselves and thus were motivated to try and
solve the tasks during all trials. Therefore, prior to each session we
subjected the orangutans to one exposure of a functional tool and
scored whether they were capable of handling it to reach a reward
and, preference tests were made where the object presented in
that task was offered next to a peanut (the reward used), in a
similar two-choice task. All problems were well within the limits
of what these orangutans were capable of.
RESULTS
Pre-trials and Preference Tests
Preference tests showed that both orangutans always preferred
the rewards over the objects, except in the flask task [Naong
preferred reward on 67% (n = 6) and Igelchen on 50% (n = 6)
of the trials). We therefore excluded the flask task from further
analyses. In pre-trials both orangutans completed 100% of the
three remaining tasks (string, rake, and tube) showing that they
were capable of using the tools when functional and presented
alone.
Effect of Time on Two Choice Tests
First, we wanted to analyse first attempts, because correct choices
were rewarding and therefore affect the remainder of the choices
(all trial 1 in Figure 2). When comparing, within individual, the
trials in the two delay treatments no differences in performance
were found (Mann–Whitney U-test: Naong: n = 12, U = 18.0,
ns, Igelchen: n = 12, U = 21.0, ns, Figure 3). No differences
were found when we tested the average performance for all six
attempts within a test session, as described in Figure 2. Thus,
we found no increase in performance when the orangutans
had the opportunity to examine the task visually for a longer
period of time (Naong: n = 12, U = 22.0, ns, Igelchen: n = 12,
U = 20.0, ns), Figure 3.
Side Preference Test
No significant difference was found between choosing objects
on the right or the left side for any of the orangutans (Mann–
Whitney U-test: Naong: n1 = 12, n2 = 12, U = 106.0, ns,
Igelchen: n1= 12, n2= 12, U = 102.0, ns).
FIGURE 2 | Results divided across the three different tasks (rope, rake, and tube) for both individuals. Shown is the difference between choices made in
the delay vs. immediate treatments across trials (correct choices were scored as 1 and incorrect choices zero).
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FIGURE 3 | Overall result showing the success rate in the two treatments. (A) Average for first trials only in all sessions and (B) average based on all six trials
for all sessions.
TABLE 1 | Results in % correct choices for both orangutans in average
over the six trials for each respective task.
Task Rope Rake Tube
Igelchen Naong Igelchen Naong Igelchen Naong
1 50 50 67 80 33 67
2 100 83 67 100 33 17
3 50 50 83 100 50 67
4 100 67 83 100 50 50
Mean 75 63 75 95 42 50
Results Averaged Over Trials
In general, the orangutans were not very successful in solving
these tasks. Regardless of time treatment, we report results
averaged over the six trials in Table 1. Igelchen performed above
80% in four of 12 tasks and Naong performed at 80% and above
in five of 12 tasks. We exclude flask tasks for reasons mentioned
above.
A Note on Attention
For a prolonged viewing time to be useful the orangutans
had to pay attention. Both individuals had extensive
experience from choosing between different objects prior
to this experiment. We have not had the opportunity to
quantify exactly what they were looking at during the
experiments, but observations during the experiment tell us
that upon withdrawal of the opaque screen their apparent
attention was, at all trials, directed toward the tray in front
of them. We do not see any reasons to suspect that the
results were biased due to a lack of attention during delay
trials.
DISCUSSION
Here, we have described a way whereby reasoning capacities
can be identified by studying if more time for decision making
improves performance in a two-choice problem solving task.
In contrast to problem solving in humans, our results do not
indicate that more time allowed for solving a problem increases
the performance of orangutans. But, it should be noted that this
negative result does not necessarily inform us about mechanisms.
We also found that that these kinds of two-choice problems
are difficult, and that orangutans cannot simply look at different
options and make decisions to collect rewards at high success
rates (Table 1). There could be other causes for the negative
results than an absence of a capacity for late binding in
orangutans, as these tasks could either have been too simple
or too difficult. If tasks were too simple, choices would be
correct irrespective of time delays, and the distribution of choices
would be highly skewed. This did not seem to be a problem
as the distribution of the number of correct choices made per
session did not deviate from normal (Kolmogorov–Smirnov test,
D= 0.15, p= 0.21). If the tasks were too difficult we would expect
the orangutans to choose at random, and this was not the case
(Table 1).
A similar study has been made on chimpanzees, orangutans
and human children. Here, subjects were allowed to observe
puzzle boxes at different intervals before opening them
(sometimes allowed 24 h or 48 h prior view of boxes vs.
immediate presentations). The authors suggested that apes are
not capable of mental rehearsal (Dunbar et al., 2005), but
unfortunately the design of that study rendered their result
uncertain. In chimpanzees, different puzzle boxes were used in
different treatments so effects of treatment could not be separated
from effects of variation in puzzle boxes. In addition, as the
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authors wrote “However, the design of the experiment inevitably
means that practice effects may confound these results” (p. 327).
There is room for improvement of these kinds of studies.
First, by studying attention, and what animals can learn from
just observing, would help improving the experimental set-
up. A better understanding of what kind of objects attract the
attention of different animals would also be helpful. This could
make the tasks better suited for the species in question, but at
the same time such specific methods might not work as well for
many species. In addition, it could be valuable to test whether
measurements of performance covaries with measurements of
attention. Choosing relevant tasks is also an important issue and
here, tests, or inspiration, from the literature would be fruitful
(e.g., Mulcahy and Call, 2006; Martin-Ordas et al., 2008; Mulcahy
et al., 2013, and references therein). Future studies can also be
improved by taking into consideration how animals, such as apes,
recognize tools that are functional (e.g., Mulcahy et al., 2013). But,
irrespective of the choice of tasks, the key manipulation is to test
with and without time delay, as this test can thereby determine
if time can improve the performance of animal decision making.
And, with respect to time delays we are most interested in longer
delays, from many seconds to minutes, to enable comparison
with humans that are capable of late binding. The method we
have described here has a few advantages. First, methodologically,
it is easier to exclude effects of individual exploration, which
matters both when comparing individual performance and
differences between species. Exploration is well known to matter
for problem solving (Benson-Amram and Holekamp, 2012) and
it varies enormously between species (Glickman and Sroges,
1966). Second, if animals are capable of late binding, it can
be detected unambiguously using this kind of method, thereby
overcoming the problems of ontogeny and generalization that
has rendered other tests ambiguous (see e.g., Anthony, 1959;
Jensen, 2006; Lind et al., 2009; von Bayern et al., 2009; Heyes,
2012).
One could argue that imposing delays upon decisions does
not have to reveal what mechanisms drive choice behavior. One
factor that could make correct choices difficult is if subjects
cannot inhibit previously rewarded responses (see discussions
in, e.g., Povinelli, 2000; Girndt et al., 2008). The appearance of
inhibition problems can potentially be predicted from learning
models that include some decision rule, and if there is knowledge
about stored values of behaviors (see e.g., how the decision rule
interacts with values of behavior in Enquist et al., 2016). But,
the aim of our study was to use a method with the potential of
detecting whether a delay could improve decisions. Our method
does not permit conclusions about how previous experiences
caused the negative finding.
In relation to learning and decision making that goes beyond
standard associative learning we would like to highlight another
paradigm that has methodological potential, but has been
neglected within animal cognition, namely outcome revaluation
studies (e.g., Chen and Amsel, 1980; Adams and Dickinson,
1981; Kenward et al., 2009). These studies have, to the best of
our knowledge, provided the best examples of reorganization of
information in animals. However, these experiments have not yet
provided clear evidence for mechanisms underlying reasoning,
because one can only see gradually inhibited responses and not
the novel, qualitatively different, responses that are to be expected
from a mechanism underlying reasoning. But, we believe this
paradigm has great potential for studying animals’ capacity for
reorganizing information because it provides a methodology that
permits clear interpretation of the experimental outcomes. It can
also be used to test explicit hypotheses about how information is
processed because experiences are well controlled, tests are made
under extinction and hidden learning phenomena can be exposed
during reacquisition phases.
CONCLUSION
Our results did not show that orangutans performed better in
two-choice task when allowed more time before decisions were
made. However, we have described a method that can prove
useful for future research into processes of reasoning in non-
human animals.
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